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ABSTRACT 
The place of technology in the management of change is examined in the light of the cultural 
environment that mediates that relationship. The utility and limitations of such an examination are 
emphasized. Some factors that encouraged technological developments in the United States and some 
behaviors and institutional arrangements that reinforced these developments are specified. The 
favorable and unfavorable consequences for the management of change today are examined in the 
context of these persisting culture patterns. Because of the apparant inevitability of social turbulence 
in the next couple of decades, guiding social change to a different and appropriate valuing of 
technology, with corresponding changes in behavior and institutions, will require the development of 
social theory and technologies far beyond those presently available. The chances of succeeding seem 
slim. 
If one defines a crucial characteristic of modernization as being an activity that extends 
into the future, then modernization necessarily becomes a problem in the management of 
change. But the meaning of management, of change itself, and the context for engineering 
particular changes either by political means or by those of organizational or individual 
development, all will depend on the culture characteristics of the society. Of the many 
culture characteristics that must be attended to in such change management approaches, I 
will focus here on the relation of technological change to social change as mediated by 
the culture context. I will emphasize technology because, in the United States, the 
creation and availability of increasingly complex and powerful technologies have, to the 
extent we understand social process, contributed enormously to and, until recently, have 
been reinforced by the particular culture characteristics of that society. Technology is not 
the only factor that needs be attended to in order to appreciate the nature of the task of 
managing social change. But, to the extent that modernization is dependent on the 
availability of technological resources and technological prowess, the ways technology is 
valued and used may tell us important things about the culture prerequisites for managing 
social change. 
There is in the anthropological literature a continuing debate on the nature of culture 
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and the objective evidence for this abstract concept. Of the definitions and theories that 
have been argued among anthropologists, certainly those of Clyde Kluckhohn rank among 
the most influential. Partly because he was my mentor and partly because his definitions 
are particularly useful for our purposes, I will apply the concept of culture in keeping 
with his ideas as set out in his chapter, “The Concept of Culture,” published, appropri- 
ately enough, in The Science ofMan in the World Crisis[ I] . I quote: 
A culture is a historically derived system of explicit and implicit designs for living, which tends 
to be shared by all or specially designated members of a group. @. 98.) A culture is not only a 
reticulum of patterned means for satisfying needs but equally a network of stylized goals for 
individual and group achievement. (p. 104.) Almost no human situations are viewed in ways 
which are altogether a consequence of the individual’s experience. Culture is-among other 
things-a set of ready-made definitions of the situation which each participant only slightly 
retailors in his own idiomatic way. @. 91.) Cultures create needs as well as provide a means of 
fulfilling them. (p. 81.) Cultures create problems as well as solving them. (p. 81.) Most specific 
needs can be satisfied in a wide variety of ways but “the culture selects” only one or a very few 
of the organically and physically possible modes. “The culture selects” is, to be sure, a 
metaphorical way of speaking. The origind choice was necessarily made by an individual and 
then followed by other individuals (or it wouldn’t have become culture). But from the angle of 
those individuals who later learn this bit of culture the existence of this element in a design for 
living has the effect of a selection which was not made by these human beings as a reaction to 
their own particular situation but was rather a choice made by individuals long gone but which 
still tends to bind our contemporary actors @. 95.) 
In other words, we are attending to the patterned set of values and behaviors that 
people hold about what is right and worthy and wrong and undesirable, and it is that set 
of values toward technology and its utility and the expected behaviors expressing those 
values that we will examine [2] . 
Some preliminary comments are in order, however, about the limits of approaching 
the management of change through the concept of the cultural environment. In the first 
place, the concept of culture is an abstraction as is the concept of society. These concepts 
are not precise and their imprecision is made greater by the pervasive lack of useful data 
about how men actually behave in their social and institutional settings. Such data would 
permit us to refine these concepts and to judge better their applicability to on-going 
circumstances. Presently, we simply do not have enough data: we literally do not know 
what we are talking about much of the time when we claim to be describing and 
analyzing the behavior of men and institutions either as it has occurred in history or at 
the present time-to say nothing of the future. In the United States, a growing awareness 
of the need for social indicator data is evidence of an appreciation developing at the 
political as well as academic level that, in fact, we do not know what is happening well 
enough to check which of various theories are appropriate for explaining and predicting 
what is happening. Not only do we lack data about what is happening now, but we lack 
data about how the present came to be. That is, we lack longitudinal data that records 
over time how men effect and are affected by their social and technological environment. 
All of these comments hold with particular emphasis when we are trying to understand 
the role of technology with regard to social changes. Data-based knowledge is prerequisite 
to the development of appropriate schemes for the management of change particularly in 
the light of the potentialities and the problems inherent in new technologies. Hence, what 
I have to say, indeed whatever anyone says, about the relationship of technology to social 
change is necessarily speculative. 
There are many studies which attempt with considerable useful insight to relate one or 
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another set of factors which seem to be of particular pertinence, but I must emphasize 
that we presently lack the methods and the data for generalizing these interpretations and 
for projecting them into the future. To be sure, within groups of observers there can be 
found concensus about what is happening to society. But this is more an indication of 
how people protect, maintain, and elaborate the vested interests of their subcultures 
through what they pay attention to than it is evidence of the validity of viewpoints held. 
And, of course, what is attended to is, to a large degree, culturally determined through 
the definitions of what particular groups ought to pay attention to. Indeed, it is only with 
the growth of concerns such as those which are focused on in this conference that time, 
effort, and approval will be applied in sufficient degree to begin to provide us with a firm 
foundation for analyzing and forecasting the relationship of technological change to 
social change in a given cultural context. 
Cultural and social change is also a function of the cultural styles available for dealing 
with changing expectations and values of both the active and passive members of society. 
It is not only the values held and behavior expressed, but it is the culturally-guided 
dialectic occurring among changes in values and behavior as they are occurring that 
influences change in social process and, thereby, complicates the task of managing 
change. To the extent that technology facilitates or inhibits changes in values and 
behavior, it affects the patterns of values and behavior and, hence, the cultural setting for 
further change. 
Social change, and the technological change intertwined with it, is also very much a 
consequence of the idiosyncracies of individuals and of history. The societal traumas or 
successes that individuals or events confer on society leave their traces in the patterns of 
expectations and the procedures for justifying and carrying them out: they modify, even 
as they are modified by, the culture patterns up to that time. These sudden and 
unexpected concatenations of men and events will become all the more likely and all the 
more significant in an increasingly dense, interactive, and technologically interdependent 
setting. Hence, I would argue that the effects of idiosyncratic circumstances will increase 
as the degree of modernization increases. 
What we are increasingly confronted with is a turbulent social environment. Those 
acting through institutions or through technology cannot know with certainty before- 
hand what will be the most likely or significant consequences of their acts because the 
social environment itself produces large effects independent of or unanticipatible from 
the deliberate acts of man and technology that are aimed at managing that environment. 
Thus, the task of cultural analysis and the application of that analysis to the management 
of change become extremely complicated as the secondary and tertiary consequences of 
the interaction of behaviors and technologies become at least as important as the initial 
consequences of the impact of a new technology. Managing the primary effects is, in a 
sense, the least of the problems involved in managing social change. 
We shall examine more specifically such secondary and tertiary consequences later 
when we shall see that the cultural circumstances that have facilitated the development of 
high technology, and hence modernization, in the West now appear to be the very ones 
that may very well undermine most, if not all, of the social edifice as it is now 
constructed. As we explore the culture context for technological development and social 
change in the United States, it is necessary to keep in mind that the present situation is in 
profound flux. Essentially, all the cultural “given? that we shall examine are now being 
challenged as to their moral rightness, their utility, or their priority. This questioning of 
the legitimacy of institutions and the beliefs used to justify their actions is profound and 
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itself appears to be a consequence of the development of a highly technologized society. 
Thus, it should be understood that in the first part of what follows, I will describe 
some cultural circumstances that gave underlying support to the development of the 
United States along lines that produced and responded to the impact and impress of 
technology. Later, we will examine some of the changes in culture that seem to be 
occurring and those that can be anticipated in the future during the period when the 
modernization we are concerned with here will be unfolding. 
In summary, what I have to say is inevitably conjectural in three senses. In the first 
place, my comments are culture-bound and, hence, of unknown generalizability especially 
to Asian and Pacific cultures about which, most regretably, I am profoundly ignorant. In 
the second place, even within a culture perspective, the interpretations of what is 
happening are of unknown validity. In the third place, one can say very little about the 
future in view of the almost certain pervasive effects of unanticipatible events. In the 
interests of style, I will not precede each statement with “I think” or “it seems to me and 
other observers,” or “it appears that.” But these qualifications are always there. 
With these caviats in mind, let me describe the structure of this paper. First I will 
discuss some culture characteristics that have encouraged technological developments in 
the United States. Second, with these characteristics in mind, I will look at some kinds 
of behaviors and institutional arrangements that support, and thereby reinforce, these 
culture characteristics. Third, we will consider some of the consequences today for the 
management of change in terms of the negative and positive consequences of the 
persisting culture patterns. And fourth, we will focus on the consequences anticipated for 
tomorrow: the inevitability of social turbulence as a source of change leading to new 
culture forms with a different valuing of technology, and the different behaviors and 
institutions for facilitating these values which will result from this process. 
Let us turn to beliefs and expectations regarding the directions of technology and the 
nature of those who direct it. Certainly, the most pervasive assumption held about the 
relation of technology to the rest of society was that progress, which was believed to be 
the desirable and attainable direction of society, is the inevitable consequence of the use 
of new technologies. While lip service was given to other means for advancing the society 
and distressed questions were raised by some, the most popular ideology and the general 
expectations were that progress would come through technology and that progress is 
desirable; hence, technology is desirable. Typically, “technology” referred to material 
technology first and biological technology more recently. Traditionally, social tech- 
nology-social engineering-has not been included in this category. 
Intimately related to equating progress and the common good with technological 
development was a basic optimism about the future[3]. This optimism developed from 
religiously-related beliefs that we were ideologically blessed and from a belief that our 
increasingly powerful technologies would give us the capabilities for manipulating the 
environment, both man and material, to the ends we choose. This optimism about the 
future pervaded not only our sense of what we could become domestically, but also what 
we could accomplish internationally. Internationally, our future was believed secured (1) 
through military superiority achievable via technological superiority, and (2) through our 
productivity and the marketability of our products also achieved through our superior 
technology. 
A further piece of the interlocking set of supporting beliefs and expectations about 
technology was that there were no limits on the degree to which men and resources could 
be harnessed to, and rewarded by, the expansion of technology. Natural resources were 
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thought to be infinitely replaceable or substitutable through new technologies, and 
human wants were believed infinitely expandable. Hence, the capacities of humans to 
consume the products of new technology were unlimited. Related to this state of mind 
was a firm belief that the only healthy economy, hence healthy society, was one that 
showed continual growth in the Gross National Product. Since progress equals expanding 
technology which results in expanding productivity, then the GNP must expand too. 
This capability of technology to expand to meet old needs and to develop new ones 
depended in part on the belief that men could and should be organized to achieve 
anything via technology that seemed important to achieve. The expectation was that by 
rationalizing activities through efficient management, accounting, and work techniques 
and, more recently, through operations research, systems analysis, computers, and the 
like, men could be organized to carry out enormously complex activities that would 
result in the development and application of new technologies. The invention of arranging 
men into inventing organizations was, for the most part, a World War II development, and 
belief in the prowess of this organizational technology to develop other technologies has 
grown rapidly since then and will continue to grow in most corporate and government 
quarters. The most recent expression of this expectation is the often-repeated assertion 
that putting a man on the moon demonstrates that we really can accomplish what we 
want, if we only have the will to do so. This view, which makes social reality just another 
version of technological reality, is so obviously distorted that its appeal can only be 
explained as the consequence of the kind of selective filters culture puts between men 
and their environment. 
Since most technological development was done, or was believed to be done, through 
private corporations, this arrangement supported the traditional belief that a pragmatic, 
entrepreneurial, free-enterprise approach was a more reliable and rewarding path to 
progress than was government planning. The evidence was ample that men and machines 
could be organized opportunistically to produce other machines to deal with new 
problems and opportunities. Since American success with the development and use of 
technology had been experienced chiefly through the entrepreneurial, pragmatic set of 
beliefs and behaviors about how to do things, there was little incentive for, and deep 
cultural resistances against, shifting to a government planning approach for choosing 
among technologies to be exploited in the public interest. The way to progress was 
through the ad hoc interaction of private interests, each exploiting technological possibili- 
ties as the opportunities appeared attractive to them. 
Now let us look at some behaviors in their individual and institutionalized forms which 
expressed and supported these patterned expectations and values regarding technology 
and which made them into self-fulfilling prophecies. Characteristic of the arrangements 
defining a culture, these discouraged examination and implementation of alternative 
societal arrangements. 
Perhaps the most crucial factor was the institutionalization of the Protestant ethic, 
which, according to at least one influential and seminal interpretation of the history of 
the West, encouraged compulsive attention to entrepreneurial activities, since the evi- 
dence of eventual access to a heavenly after-life was demonstrated through success in this 
world [4]. Entrepreneurial motivations and opportunities were furthered by the expand- 
ing variety of possibilities for success that technology made possible. In a nontechnologi- 
cal society, the means for demonstrating accomplishment were prescribed and limited. In 
a society exploiting technology, the opportunities were unlimitedly great for developing 
new markets and discovering new uses for the capabilities of the technologies, and they 
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were so used. In this way, the exploitation of technology required the development of 
complementary new life styles, roles, and statuses. 
Facilitating this was the high value placed by the culture on achieving status rather 
than being legitimized by an ascribed status[S] . Evidences that people were valued for 
their personal achievements, rather than for their family or clan affiliations, contributed 
to the belief, at least among white people, that one could achieve success and to 
fulfillment of that belief. Since there were comparatively few barriers of tradition-and 
privilege which obstructed the achievement of success through one’s abilities to manipu- 
late the natural and social environment, and since many ways of manipulating the 
environment were new, made possible by the technology, more opportunities for achieve- 
ment were always arising. These new ways would have been inhibited if tradition, 
convention, and status by ascription had dominated the value system. 
Mass public education was a third institutional form for producing behavior that 
furthered the beliefs and expectations about the utility and consequences of using 
technology. Mass education ingrained expectations and behavior for roles as producers 
and as consumers. Thereby, many people learned skills that could be applied to produc- 
tion, to the management of production via new technoiogies, and to the creation of new 
technologies. Equally important, they learned a set of values that stressed the desirability 
of consuming the products of the technologies, and the capabilities of technology to 
provide the basis for an ever-increasing standard of living, national prowess, and Gross 
National Product. Fundamentally, American mass education was designed to incorporate 
immigrants into the dominant culture style and, thereby, to produce people in resonance 
with the technological and managerial requirements of the times. 
In recent years, the invention of management technologies designated to forward 
technological development more efficiently has reinforced the beliefs about technology, 
national growth, and its management. Management-facilitating systems are developed and 
disseminated by business schools, organizations providing current information about new 
management techniques, private organizations that train executives in specific manage- 
ment techniques, and many periodicals. More recently, the management field has in- 
cluded techniques such as program budgeting and planning, operations research, and 
systems analysis. Some of these techniques first demonstrated their utility during World 
War II and subsequently in the U.S. Department of Defense. Again, the high status 
accorded to technology applied to national security has served to give initial legitimacy to 
these techniques, i.e., if they are good for defense technology they must also be good for 
other parts of society. 
Related to this set of managerial behavior technologies is the style of behavior deemed 
appropriate for members of task-oriented groups or corporate entities. Largely culturally 
determined, this style puts heavy emphasis on rational behavior and the repression of the 
emotions. This emphasis on the rational with its concomitant repudiation of feelings in 
interpersonal relations has been demonstrated to be very costly to effective manage- 
ment [6]. Nevertheless, so strong has been the cultural cannon against showing feelings in 
task-oriented, interpersonal behavior that only recently have some organizations begun to 
experiment with more creative forms of management. There is a small but growing 
application of knowledge about group process and interpersonal behavior to the tech- 
nology of managing technology, and, there are many experiments under way with new 
management forms and new ways of operating task groups at all levels of organization. 
While these techniques appear to have demonstrated considerable ability to increase 
organizational efficiency and flexibility, they carry with them two important conse- 
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quences. On the one hand, there is the tendency for these techniques to be used to 
manipulate people into more efficient “cogs” in the organization; that is, organization- 
development technology is used with the intent of altering people in the same spirit as 
technology is used to alter inanimate forms of matter. Necessarily, this corrodes those 
values in the American culture that emphasize the integrity and autonomy of the 
individual. On the other hand, since these techniques also tend to facilitate more 
widespread participation in decision-making they tend to lead to revisions in the defini- 
tions of power and status and the arrangements that support and enforce them. It is not 
mere coincidence that efforts at participant management, sensitivity training, T-group 
training, and so on shade-off into encounter groups and a variety of experimental 
activities that attract people seeking new ways of life that often reject the technological 
and the bureaucratic. 
An important consequence of the circumstances we have been discussing has been that 
most people in the United States have experienced the consequences of technological 
development chiefly through personal purchases of items that enhance their sense of 
well-being. Since technology enhances their sense of well-being, they tend to project their 
personal experiences onto the whole society. That is, they feel a rewarding relationship 
with technology since they are able to select from an increasing number of rewarding 
options as a result of a higher standard of living in large part created by greater 
productivity resulting from better technologies. Thus, individuals who can afford the 
personal benefits of technology have been drawn away, so to speak, from attending to the 
appalling consequences the accumulation of affluent, individual choices have had on the 
natural and human environment as a whole. This selective perception contributes to the 
lack of institutional arrangements for the support of technologies for the public welfare 
which cannot depend for direct support on the existence of a market clientele. This is 
most evident in the areas of pollution control and environmental quality in general as well 
as in areas such as mass transport, low-cost housing, and truly good education. There are, 
of course, other obstructions to the development of public welfare technologies. Some 
arise from corporate preoccupation with products that involve minimum risk and re- 
organization; in government agencies they amount to analogous preoccupations with 
bureaucratic protection of their special constituencies. But, overall, the emphasis on 
private consumption and the rewards of private consumption, which encourage that 
emphasis, have discouraged attention to investment in social welfare technology. 
These expectancies and values about technology, interacting with technological de- 
velopments and other processes in the society, evolved into the form we recognize today 
of a highly developed technological society with enormous, indeed, outrageous disparities 
between its greatest and its least accomplishments. These disparities offer increasing 
evidence of the inadequacy of just these life styles we have reviewed for trying to manage 
social change partially through the use of technology. What is becoming clear to 
observers, including some in government and industry, is the absolute need for some sort 
of planned social change, for long-range planning that extends over a decade or more. But 
this need implies an equally pressing need for basic changes in the values and expectations 
held and behaviors practiced-the culture pattern-so that social change management 
philosophies and activities can be implemented in a very short time. The short time 
requirement seems crucial: as I shall argue subsequently, it appears that, in the United 
States, survival of a social system based on our conventional interpretation of a democra- 
tic philosophy is highly problematic, and the risks to its survival are becoming greater the 
longer it takes to get major changes implemented in the management of that society. 
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Note that I am not saying that the technology for social, long-range planning presently 
exists. Rather, I am saying that the beginnings of such a technology do exist and the 
necessary circumstances for its further development depend on deliberate efforts to 
utilize and refine it. To date, these efforts have been lacking for the most part. 
The development of the United States under a culture pattern that encouraged an 
essentially ad hoc, laissez-faire approach to technological elaboration, appears to have 
produced a state of affairs of such complexity and difficulty that it is really impossible to 
see how to get from the present into a desirable future in a coherent, deliberate, and 
politically democratic manner. In effect, the United States faces enormous problems 
pertinent to the management of change, problems of modernization or, better, post- 
modernization, that are analogous to those in Asia and the Pacific. It is increasingly 
evident that, just as many culture values in other parts of the world are contradictory to 
the conditions needed for modernization, so too the traditional culture pattern in the 
United States is contradictory to the conditions necessary for postmodernization. Our 
crises in governance, in the management of control and freedom, are similar to those in 
other parts of the world that are far less dependent on high technology. 
Let us, therefore, now attend to those residual traditional values and styles which seem 
contradictory to the needs of today, to the needs of a society in important part created 
out of the interactions of those traditional values and styles. 
First, there is widespread resistance to long-range planning by government. Planning as 
perceived within the traditional set of behaviors and values implies control, loss of 
autonomy, and loss of those entrepreneurial conditions which have allowed so many 
people to become so successful, often at the expense of so many others, and to jeopardize 
the natural environment to which man’s survival is ultimately linked. The resistance to 
planning grows out of the state of mind associated with the learned success of non- 
planned approaches to societal development, and out of an apprehensiveness toward 
risking restrictions on “doing one’s own thing,” to use the contemporary phrase. The 
resistance to planning also derives from the positive value put on one meaning of 
pragmatism. For Americans, pragmatism is often perceived as the equivalent of expedient 
activity sufficient to the moment at hand. It is much less often perceived as the proper 
philosophy for evaluating in a longer time context the appropriateness of the means used. 
Many people raised and rewarded by the traditional culture view their world as one that is 
still relatively segregated and relatively noninterdependent; they expect that there always 
will be room for expansion (the frontier philosophy), that social interdependence is low, 
that what there is is encompassible (the small town, low population, and low event- 
density philosophy), and that whatever goes wrong can be rectified by further deliberate 
actions (the optimistic, “technological-fix” philosophy). All of these expectations and 
reinforcing behaviors sustain a lack of appreciation for the need for interactive, inter- 
dependent behavior, and hence for planned behavior. Planned behavior is needed to 
compensate for the absence of culturally defined behavior and values that, of themselves, 
would constrain behavior to that which is compatible with high levels of interdependence 
and interaction. Such a culture pattern does not exist for most of the population. 
In the light of what we know about how attitudes and beliefs are reinforced, such 
values will follow after experiences which make one kind of living rewarding and another 
punishing. Probably, we shall have to plan first and then, out of the consequent 
experiences in living with these plans, may grow the values that can replace part of the 
planning behavior itself. If people learn to live in ways that assume intense inter- 
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dependency, then behaviors that are expected and valued will of themselves serve some of 
the directing purposes that planning now would substitute for. 
Another increasingly inappropriate culture style still offers substantial rewards for 
most of those who have grown up within it: this is the hierarchical structure which 
characterizes interpersonal and intraorganizational relationships in most organizations, in 
particular in corporations and government. The essentially pyramidal organizational 
arrangement grew out of more primitive culture patterns of family structure and preda- 
tory and defense tactics. It was reasonably applicable to comparatively simple organiza- 
tions with stable task allocations and simple response patterns, a situation that also 
characterized the earlier years of technology utilization. Furthermore, the bureaucratic 
structures associated with organizational pyramids did have the virtue of rationalizing the 
services the organization provided by insulating the organization from the environment. It 
insulated the organization, in part, in order to limit the amount of disruptive information 
coming into the organization so that there would be sufficient organizational stability to 
respond to stable environmental demands. This, thereby, made services, particularly those 
provided by governments, less subject to corruption and caprice, and more reliable. 
However, as a result of the development of an increasingly differentiated environment 
that made an increasing variety of demands on the institutions serving it, and as a result 
of the increasing number of consequences produced when these institutions insert new 
technologies into the society without sufficient preplanning and control, the bureaucratic 
structure has become, by its very nature, comparatively rigid and unresponsive. 
What are now needed are “disruptable” organizations, so to speak, which are better 
able to respond to a variety of rapidly changing demands from the environment by being 
better able to make transformations within the organization. The pyramidal structure, the 
bureaucratic structure, cannot accomplish this. But, it is particularly difficult to shift 
structures when organizations feel themselves challenged, besieged, under stress-the 
conditions of today. When confronted with such challenges, those who have succeeded by 
leading organizations to their present condition usually try to retreat, in a typical human 
manner, to patterns of behavior which worked in the past. For that very reason, they are 
unlikely to work in the present. But short of catastrophe and deep crises, when 
organizations seem most open to change, the tendency is to cling to rigid, unresponding 
structures. 
Closely related to the conditions just described is the set of values and expectancies in 
the culture that traditionally has made it difficult, if not impossible, for public and 
political figures to acknowledge, to embrace, error in public. That is, United States 
tradition sets a high value on not being wrong and, indeed, partly defines its leaders as 
those who have the ability to be right. Error has an aura of sinfullness about it or, at least, 
of reprehensible inadequacy. Hence, public figures pretend error didn’t happen or, if it 
did, it was someone else’s fault. Error is punished; success is rewarded. The belief that one 
ought to be able to succeed is especially reinforced by expectations about our ability to 
control our actions, expectations applied to the human realm that derive from successes 
we have come to expect in the technological realm. Many counterproductive conse- 
quences thereby arise. In particular, there is great reluctance throughout government and 
corporations to be truly innovative because the uncertainty in the situation is so high that 
the chance of error is also high. Thus, it is seldom worth the personal or economic risk for 
successful members of organizations to champion innovation when circumstances are 
sufficiently rewarding without doing so. 
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Embracing error as a positive virtue is a requirement for effective long-range social 
planning because all such planning, if it is to be humane and responsive to reality, must be 
flexible with regard to reevaluation of goals and priorities and the means for realizing 
them. Planning must include an explicit moral obligation to learn from what goes wrong. 
Such an approach, which assumes that the future is highly uncertain, runs contrary to the 
deep-lying optimism referred to earlier. It also runs contrary to the pragmatic definition 
that one can always rectify a situation and that “too little and too late” is not really a 
plausible outcome. 
One basic cultural shift required to make error-embracing feasible would place social 
experiment and social development ahead of reelection. Politicians at all levels in the 
United States set-and traditionally are expected to set-reelection as their prime obliga- 
tion and have seldom been known to jeopardize reelection in the interest of more 
tenuous, long-range aims for this society. Clearly, such a shift in political values and styles 
would necessitate profound changes in the American social system. Among other things, 
it would carry with it the need for long-range political stability in order to cope with 
short-range, as well as long-range, social turbulence. How these needs might be reconciled 
is completely unknown at this time. 
In addition to the counterproductive residual cultural characteristics, there are residual 
cultural characteristics which are especially compatible with the requirements for the 
management of social change in a postmodernized society. In the first place, traditional 
modes of optimism and pragmatism can operate as culture characteristics that encourage 
shifts in values towards planning and the gathering of social information as a basis for 
taking action. That is, some spokesmen take the position that there are great things that 
we should and can do and that these will take longer to do and are more important to do 
than other things we have done. They feel that we have to get organized to do them; that 
we must plan so we can do them. So far, this mood is chiefly rhetoric and it remains to be 
seen whether those espousing this value position will be able to recruit and develop the 
behavior needed in others or, indeed, if they themselves understand the implications of 
their position. However, one indication that this movement may gain strength is the 
increasing attention being given to the need to collect social indicator data as a basis for 
knowing what is happening and for doing something about it. Since such data reflect both 
the moment and change over time, they are necessary (but not sufficient) for planning. 
Also encouraging are expressions in Congress and professional organizations of the need 
for, and interest in, doing longer-range technological assessments as a basis for deciding 
whether or not it is in the societal interest to produce particular technologies and how to 
apply them. This, too, is still at the rhetorical or at the introductory legislative stage and 
it remains to be seen how seriously these new value priorities will be taken when the 
changes in behavior needed to fulfill them become explicit. 
The value placed on achieved status over ascribed status can be seen as carrying with it 
an inherent questioning of legitimacy whenever any of those who have achieved status are 
encouraged to retain it so long and so unquestioningly that it becomes, in effect, ascribed 
at least to the extent that the behaviors and values associated with it are treated as if they 
were self-evident and unquestionable. Hence, the questioning of legitimacy which is 
presently disrupting the United States also carries with it the potential for reallocation of 
status and power and the values that underly these, and, thereby, the potential for 
organizational invention and innovation. The potential for social experimentation is great 
within this mood of questioning legitimacy. But so too is the potential for social disaster 
through the disolution of existing shared patterns of expected behavior. Without such 
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shared patterns men are unable to assign priorities and allocate resources over long 
enough time periods and on a large enough scale to meet social needs even poorly. 
As suggested earlier, the development of a management technology bodes both well 
and ill. It is worth discussing again in this context as an example of a favorable expression 
of a residual traditional culture pattern when related to the pragmatic approach and to 
the belief in the virtues of technology. In the management technology field there are a 
number of humanitarian psychologists and executives eager to enhance the opportunities 
in job settings for creativeness and fulfilling work. As a result, a number of experiments 
are under way which attempt to redefine conventional organizational power to allow 
participants the scope to be more productive and creative. These experiments depend on 
the deliberate, self-conscious examination of self working with others, task-group pro- 
cesses, and shared goal-setting responsibilities. As such, these efforts are in the rational 
tradition of the West, in the technological, optimistic tradition which treats self as 
something capable of deliberate change and growth. This need not necessarily demean the 
sense of individuality. Indeed, it is an opportunity to enhance sense of self and of others 
since an atmosphere of trust is produced and, with it, greater incentives to risk un- 
certainty and innovation. These experiments in both voluntaristic and corporate settings 
appear to be rewarding in terms of personal satisfactions and organizational effectiveness. 
I will turn now to anticipating some consequences of the interplay between the 
positive and negative aspects of these residual culture values as they may affect the place 
of technology and the management of social change. In this way, we will see additional 
challenges that a postmodernized society faces in dealing with the culture premises which 
have made it a highly technologized society. And, since one way or another the 
modernizing nations will have to deal with whatever conditions exist in the post- 
modernized societies, we will better appreciate also the additional challenges for those 
nations seeking to modernize themselves. It is in this way that futurist conjectures 
become essentially pertinent for modernizing efforts. For, while it can be argued that the 
most pressing problems of these nations are those that exist right now, these problems, by 
their very nature, will only be solved in the future-five, ten, twenty years from now. 
They exist now, but they cannot be solved now. Hence, plausible future circumstances 
become crucial for planning now how to resolve these problems over future years. 
Plausible future circumstances become the context for choosing among alternative pro- 
cedures for planning solutions to present problems. Thus, the future is the present for 
modernizers. It can only be ignored if the future is assumed to be the same as the present. 
And, as we shall see, the future of the postmodernized societies is certain to be much 
different from the present and past situation. Thereby, the situation will also be different 
for modernizing societies to the extent they will be interdependent with the post- 
modernized societies. 
All evidence suggests that, at least for the next couple of decades, the United States 
will be a highly turbulent society more likely than not, demoralizing itself into a 
splintered, culturally amorphous state of chronic social crises and catastrophe. The 
turmoil arises from an increasing questioning of the premises underlying the society and 
from the divergent and various behaviors associated with that questioning. At the same 
time, there is a growing lack of adequate forms of governance, negotiation, mediation, 
and constructive control. This lack can be ascribed to three general conditions. 
First, the very challenging of the premises of the culture from so many and from such 
widely diverse sources as young versus old, black versus white, rich versus poor, and white 
collar versus blue collar, presents the society with a situation that a viable culture 
230 DONALD N. MICHAEL 
patterning does not face, by and large-namely, its own undermining. Hence, there are no 
institutions that are really effective for dealing with this state of affairs. Dissent has 
always been constrained to expression and action within the rules of the game. Now 
dissent includes rejection of the rules. The culture has no means for coping adequately 
with its own rejection, so to speak. 
Second, we are subject to a new property in this type of social system: because of 
large population size and the high frequency of repetitive events, very small percents of 
people or events now become socially perturbing. This is so whether it be an unlikely but 
now frequent tanker break-up or ghetto riots or protests by a small percent of house- 
wives, hard hats, or hippies. 
Third, there is the very complexity and interdependence, the fragility of the society, 
with its vulnerability to the unanticipated adverse consequences of technologies whether 
it be oil leaks, inversion layers, nuclear explosions, or the high-speed exchange of 
emotions, made possible by TV. There are no adequate forms of governance for compre- 
hending, anticipating, and dealing with the scale, variety, and speed of interactiveness of 
the men and events in the society. Hence, all traditional approaches are likely to be 
relatively inadequate, and all new approaches are likely to have a high rate of failures as 
would any experiments performed under such relatively blind and complicated condi- 
tions. Thus, United States society is bound to be in a state of continual high turmoil. 
Add to this the longer-range unanticipated ecological burdens imposed on the environ- 
ment and the men in it by the sheer numbers of people using, wasting, and polluting their 
environment. Add further the more obvious consequences of thermal pollution from 
nuclear reactors and other forms of environmental distortion from chemical pollutants. 
Necessarily, either the environment will steadily deteriorate, thereby multiplying the 
turbulence of the social situation, or a major reallocation of resources will have to be put 
into preserving the environment. Such a reallocation will impose novel behavioral con- 
straints on large numbers of organizations, people, and styles of life. This will further 
increase turbulences. 
In such a societal and environmental situation we can expect alternative and simultan- 
eous periods of repression and license as the society, through formal and informal modes 
of governance, tries to cope with turbulence either by repressing it or allowing freer reign. 
The former approach cannot solve the problem of turbulence: repression will generate 
reactive turbulence since the society is too big and too heterogeneous to repress totally. 
License generates social frictions, unpredictability, and, thereby, more turbulence. But it 
also provides opportunities for discovering and synthesizing new styles of conduct. There 
is, to my mind, a slight hope-but only a slight hope-that from these, with luck and 
wisdom and deliberate research, we will learn enough about the appropriate culture base 
for such a society to be able to establish the conditions for managing a society of this 
complexity. What that set of values and expectancies might be is not presently evident. 
There may be glimmers of its characteristics in the behavior of some of the groups of 
young people with their experiments in sharing and commune life. However, these 
expressions seem to be more residues of past utopian ideals, derived from a simpler day 
when the facts of technology and social complexity did not exist. 
If a stable culture pattern is developed, it is entirely reasonable to expect that 
technology will no longer be seen as an inherently positive expression of man which 
should be left to its own efflorescence and proliferation. Rather, technology and its 
development and utilization will be increasingly a matter subject to careful evaluation in a 
setting of human need values that are more primary and determining. To ask what these 
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values and procedures would be and when they will be in operation would be much like 
asking members of feudal culture to characterize the yet-to-be-evolved culture based on a 
money and market economy. They simply couldn’t do so: the experiences upon which to 
base the concepts didn’t exist. 
As the United States and, quite possibly, Europe and other highly industrialized areas 
go through the anguish and crises of discovering that their culture bases are inadequate 
for providing the rewards, goals, and governance needed in a highly technologized society, 
these traditional Western culture models will become increasingly less attractive to those 
areas of Asia and the Pacific seeking to modernize themselves. The cost of technological 
modernization, United States style, will become more evident to them as time goes on. 
But, the costs of not modernizing are already evident. Confronted with this dilemma, we 
can expect that all areas of the world will have to struggle with the terrible and exciting 
challenge of trying to discover forms of life and the values underlying them that one can 
reasonably hope will provide the rewards of technologically based society without the 
outrageous costs which are becoming more and more evident. The outcome of that 
struggle is, to my mind, unpredictable. If it is successful, the culture forms will very likely 
be quite different from what we might imagine them to be. 
The task will be extraordinarily difficult-if it can be done deliberately at all. Whatever 
else it requires, it is necessary that men in power come to use knowledge about society’s 
workings, about future possibilities, about themselves, far more broadly and easily than 
now is the case[7]. Contrary to the myth in the West that “if you build a better mouse 
trap, the world will beat a path to your door,” the clear facts are that the inventor usually 
has to drag the world kicking and screaming to even look at his trap. This is especially 
true when we are talking about getting knowledge used that is innovative with regard to 
man and society: cultures are designed to screen out all but certain innovations, as the 
earlier quotations from Kluckhohn emphasize. So far, it looks like both Eastern and 
Western cultures are designed to screen out innovations of the sort that would be needed 
to manage humanely a huge world of men and machines, but of limited resources. 
If we are to find a way out, it will require that we come to value highly the application 
of new knowledge about men and institutions. We are developing some technology that 
facilitates knowledge utilization but for the most part we simply know better than we did 
how little we know about such a technology. This technology needs to be applied to 
changing institutions and organizations so that they can effectively meet the changed 
conditions that render them inadequate, so that they can do long-range planning, and so 
that they-the men in them-can easily embrace error and quickly learn therefrom. We 
now have the beginnings of a technology for changing organizations-but only a begin- 
ning. And we need to develop a technology for designing institutions and organizations 
that can respond effectively and humanely to the turbulent environment I described 
earlier. With regard to this requirement, we do not have even the beginnings of such a 
technology: We are only beginning to develop the theory [8] . 
I can only conclude that, given our problems in the East and West, and given our 
primitive social technologies for dealing with them, we are bound to experience more 
social turbulence and many social calamities. This social context means that it will be 
harder to do the research and development needed to improve the social technologies 
described above. However, disasters and crises provide the easiest occasion to initiate 
organizational innovations and value changes. The problem is to be ready beforehand 
with the means for increasing the likelihood of establishing the desired change when the 
disaster provides the opportunity. But this means putting a major effort into crises and 
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postdisaster planning. And this requires acknowledging that the chances are poor of 
averting crises and disaster, and that we must prepare for the worst. Men in positions of 
leadership and power have an almost impossible time doing this. In terms of the culture 
values East and West, such acknowledgment is politically suicidal. At a deeper level, such 
acknowledgment means that successful men-including you and me-must accept that 
their very image of themselves as successful is now and henceforth wrong. We must 
acknowledge that we really know very little about how to deal creatively with tomorrow. 
We need to acknowledge that, somehow, we have discovered and are ensnared in a new 
wilderness, a new jungle, and that the skills that got us here are inadequate to get us out. 
Looking around us, we must acknowledge that we really are lost. 
Will we find our way out? That depends at least on recognizing that we do not know 
where we are, and on drastically reordering our beliefs and behaviors so that we can begin 
to try to find out. This reorganization itself may not be enough; it may not come in time. 
But it is the least we can do and the first thing we must do. Can we do it? I doubt it, but 
none of us understands the dynamics of societies well enough to be sure. So I shall 
continue to try. 
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